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Abstract
Higher-dimensional symmetric games become of more and more importance for applied
micro- and macroeconomic research. Standard approaches to uniqueness of equilibria have
the drawback that they are restrictive or not easy to evaluate analytically. In this paper
I provide some general but comparably simple tools to verify whether a symmetric game
has a unique symmetric equilibrium or not. I distinguish between the possibility of multiple
symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria which may be economically interesting and
is useful to gain further insights into the causes of asymmetric equilibria in symmetric games
with higher-dimensional strategy spaces. Moreover, symmetric games may be used to derive
some properties of the equilibrium set of certain asymmetric versions of the symmetric game.
I further use my approach to discuss the relationship between stability and (in)existence of
multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability, inexistence
of multiple symmetric equilibria and the unimportance of strategic effects for the compara-
tive statics, this relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric
adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric equilibrium for reasonable compara-
tive statics of symmetric changes. Finally, I present an alternative condition for a symmetric
equilibrium to be a local contraction which is more general than the conventional approach of
diagonal dominance and yet simpler to evaluate than the eigenvalue condition of continuous
adjustment processes.
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1 Introduction
In the micro- and macroeconomic literature symmetric games usually are the simplest approach
to investigate the equilibrium response of the players involved to some exogenous change. Often,
the equilibrium properties of the symmetric game is of self-interest and sometimes conditions that
assert properties as uniqueness or stability of the equilibrium in the symmetric game provide
further insights about the properties of the equilibrium set in asymmetric variations of the
game. Unfortunately, standard methods to investigate the properties of the equilibrium set of a
symmetric game are either very restrictive (contraction or univalence approach) and generally
difficult to evaluate analytically because, especially in higher dimensions, large Jacobian matrices
are involved.
In this paper I develop comparably simple conditions that assert whether a differentiable sym-
metric game has a unique equilibrium. My approach to uniqueness is different from the literature
as I distinguish between multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. By taking
explicit advantage of the symmetry in the game I derive two criteria that, if both are satisfied,
assert that only one equilibrium, the symmetric equilibrium, exists. One criterion rules out the
possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria and the other criterion rules out the possibility of
asymmetric equilibria. The method presented in this paper shows that the complexity of exam-
ining uniqueness in a general N -player game can be reduced to the case of a two-player game.
Moreover, the index theorem, commonly accepted as the most general approach to uniqueness,
is only applicable under the assumption of severe boundary conditions - a requirement that can
be weakened as this paper reveals. Moreover, by examining the equilibrium set of a symmetric
game we can derive certain properties of the equilibrium set of asymmetric variations of the
game. This insight is substantial as the symmetric game usually is a lot easier to work with.
The paper is structured as follows. After building up the required notation I derive and discuss
the two criteria, that together assert uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in case of one- and
two-dimensional strategy spaces1. As an interesting result we see that in two-dimensional games
with at most weakly decreasing direct responses there can never be asymmetric equilibria if the
game has an increasing and a decreasing cross-over response or at least one cross-over response
is constant. Despite the comparably high simplicity, my approach still is very general as the
two conditions, when applied to the Cournot game, also produce the two main conditions of
1I also illustrate that the method extends in a straightforward way to higher dimensional games.
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uniqueness that have been recognized by the literature. My approach enhances these conditions
with a new interpretation. Further, I show that there is an intimate connection between the
inexistence of asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric game and whether or not we can expect
an asymmetric variation of the game to produce equilibria with a strategy-ordering that reflects
asymmetry (e.g. the firm with cheaper production costs will set a lower price in any equilib-
rium). In section 4 I expose the relationship between stability of a symmetric equilibrium and
multiplicity of symmetric equilibria. Generally, the existence of multiple symmetric equilibria,
rather than the existence of asymmetric equilibria, is problematic for stability and comparative
statics. While stability under symmetric adjustments, inexistence of multiple symmetric equi-
libria and the unimportance of strategic effects for the sign of the comparative statics are the
same properties of a one-dimensional game this equivalence breaks down in higher dimensions.
Nevertheless, a restricted version of myopic stability, stability under symmetric adjustments, is
necessary to obtain reasonable comparative statics of symmetric equilibria. Finally, I derive a
condition that asserts whether a symmetric equilibrium is a local contraction, which is simple
to check, and yet more general than the usual requirement of a dominant diagonal.
2 Existence of symmetric equilibria
In this section I build up the notation and then derive a sufficient condition for the existence of
a symmetric equilibrium.
2.1 Notation and assumptions
The notation follows Topkis (Topkis (1998)). Consider a non-cooperative game of 2 ≤ N <
∞ identical players. Players are indexed by a number 1, ..., N and all players have the same
strategy space. Throughout the paper strategies are defined to be pure strategies. Let xg ≡
(xg1, ..., xgk) ∈ S(k) denote a feasible strategy of player g where S(k) ⊂ Rk+ denotes the strategy
space of the player. Let S ≡ S(k) be the product space S = ×ki=1Si where Si =
[
0, S¯i
] ⊂ R+
with S¯i > 0 for all i = 1, ..., k. Thus S is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of an Euclidian
space. Further x = (x1, ..., xN ) ∈ SN ⊂ RkN+ denotes a strategy profile and SN = S × ... × S
also is compact and convex. For a player g and a given strategy profile x the vector x−g ∈ SN−1
denotes the vector of strategies of all (N − 1) players except player g. Sometimes I simply write
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x = (xg, x−g). The payoff function of player g is a real-valued and differentiable function Πg(x)
defined on SN . Following Dasgupta and Maskin symmetry means permutation-invariance of the
payoff functions (Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)):
Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN ) = Πσ(g)
(
xσ(1), ..., xσ(g), ..., xσ(N)
)
(1)
for g = 1, ..., N where σ is a permutation of the set {1, ..., N}. This especially implies that
Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN ) = Πg
(
xµ(1), ..., xg, ..., xµ(N)
)
for g = 1, ..., N where µ is a permutation of {1, ..., N} \ {g}. For simple reference I set
Π (xg, x−g) ≡ Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN ) g = 1, ..., N
The non-cooperative k-dimensional symmetric game is the triple
(
N,S(k)N ,Π
)
. Throughout
this paper I shall maintain the following assumption on Π:
Assumption 1 For g ∈ {1, ..., N} the payoff function Π(xg, x−g) ∈ C2
(
SN ,R
)
satisfies (1)
and is strictly quasiconcave in xg ∈ S for any x−g ∈ S(N−1).
The property of permutation-invariance implies2
∂Πg (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN )
∂xg
=
∂Πg
(
xµ(1), ..., xg, ..., xµ(N)
)
∂xg
For simple reference I set
Πi (xg, x−g) ≡ ∂Π
g (x1, ..., xg, ..., xN )
∂xgi
1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ g ≤ N
In a non-cooperative game every player g solves
max
xg∈S
Π(xg, x−g) (2)
2Note that the following expression is a vector derivative.
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I denote the best response function of player g by
ϕg : SN−1 → S , x−g 7→ ϕg(x−g)
and use ϕ(x−g) ≡ ϕg(x−g) for simple reference. Similarly,
ϕgi : S
N−1 → Si , x−g 7→ ϕgi (x−g)
is the i-th component (1 ≤ i ≤ k) of ϕg and I set ϕi(x−g) ≡ ϕgi (x−g).
To find a symmetric equilibrium in specific symmetric games usually a simplified approach, the
symmetric opponents form approach (SOFA), is used (e.g. Dixit (1986), p. 116 or Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) or Salop (1979)). The SOFA takes player g = 1 and sets x−1 = x¯−1 ≡ (x¯, ..., x¯)
where x¯ ∈ S and Π˜ (x1, x¯) ≡ Π1 (x1, x¯−1) and then solves
max
x1∈S
Π˜ (x1, x¯) (3)
Let ϕ˜(x¯) ≡ ϕ(x¯−1) ∈ S denote the set of maximisiers of (3). A symmetric equilibrium of(
N,SN ,Π
)
then is a point x∗ ∈ SN with x∗1 = ... = x∗N and x∗1 ∈ ϕ˜(x∗1).
2.2 An existence result
It is well-known that the set of all pure-strategy equilibrium points of a non-cooperative game
is identical to the set of fixed points of the joint best response correspondence (see, e.g. Topkis
(1998), p. 179). The following proposition is easy to prove.
Proposition 1 Assumption 1 implies the following two facts for the symmetric game
(
N,SN ,Π
)
:
(i) There exists a continuous joint best-response function
φ : SN → SN , x 7→

ϕ(x−1)
...
ϕ(x−N )
 (4)
(ii)
(
N,SN ,Π
)
has a symmetric equilibrium x∗ ∈ SN
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Proof: Appendix (6.2)
A question frequently asked is, when do only interior equilibria exist. Let
∇F (x) ≡

∇Π1(x1, ..., xN )
∇Π2(x1, ..., xN )
...
∇ΠN (x1, ..., xN )
 (5)
denote the pseudogradient (a Nk vector; Rosen (1965)) of
(
N,SN ,Π
)
at x where
∇Πg (x1, ..., xN ) for g = 1, ..., N is the gradient (a k-vector) of the payoff function of player g
with respect to xg. Let Eˆ ≡
{
x ∈ SN : φ(x) = x} denote the set of all fixed points of φ. The
set E of all interior equilibria (which might be empty) is
E ≡ {x ∈ Int(SN ) : ∇F (x) = 0} (6)
where Int(SN ) denotes the interior of SN . Let J(x) denote the Jacobian (a Nk×Nk matrix) of
∇F (x) with respect to x. The following assumption asserts that only interior equilibria exist.
Assumption 2 (Boundary condition) The gradient field
∇F : SN → RNk , x 7→ ∇F (x) (7)
points into the interior of SN at all boundary points.
Proposition 2 The following two properties characterise the set of equilibria of
(
N,SN ,Π
)
i) Under assumption 2 only interior equilibria exist: Eˆ = E
ii) If all equilibrium points are regular, i.e. the Jacobian J(x) has Det(J(x)) 6= 0 for all
x ∈ E, then E is a finite set.
Proof: Appendix (6.3)
Intuitively, i) is true because if assumption 2 holds but there also were a boundary equilibrium
this would contradict the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficient conditions. ii) holds because the
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regularity condition implies that all equilibrium points are locally isolated and a compact and
”discrete” set must be finite. Note that assumption 2 is sufficient (but not necessary) for ruling
out boundary equilibria.
When dealing with asymmetric equilibria I will require the best response function ϕ(x−g) to
be differentiable at certain points. As the following corollary states, assumption 1 asserts that
ϕ(x−g) is differentiable in x−g if ϕ(x−g) ∈ Int(S).
Corollary 1 If ϕ(x−g) ∈ Int(S) then ϕ(x−g) is differentiable at x−g.
Proof: Appendix (6.4)
3 Uniqueness
This section first summarises the main two approaches to uniqueness: the univalence approach
and the index approach. Then I develop the condition which excludes asymmetric equilibrira
in case of one-dimensional strategy spaces first for the case of two players and then for the case
of N players. Afterwards, I extend the results to the case of two-dimensional strategy spaces
and N ≥ 2. Then I introduce the condition for the inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria.
The section concludes with an application of these criteria to the Cournot game and a brief
discussion of super- and submodular games.
3.1 Review: criteria for uniqueness
In order to determine whether or not a game has a unique equilibrium the literature has come
up with three general approaches:
i) the contraction approach
ii) the univalence approach
iii) the Poincare-Hopf index theorem approach
I will first provide a short summary of the univalence approach and the index approach in the
context of symmetric games and ignore the restrictive3 contraction approach. Note that generally
3It is straightforward to show that the contraction approach is a special case of the univalence approach (see
Vives (1999)).
7
nothing detains us from applying these methods to a symmetric game but these methods have
in common that they rely on boundary conditions and usually are impractical in the context of
particular applications as the matrices involved can be very large.
3.1.1 The Univalence Approach
The univalence approach developed by Gale and Nikaido (Gale and Nikaido (1965)) provides
sufficient conditions under which a mapping is globally univalent (i.e. one-to-one). The following
is a reformulation of the univalence theorem from Gale and Nikaido (p. 89) in the context of a
symmetric game.
Theorem 1 (Gale-Nikaido) If all principal minors of (−J(x)) are positive for all x ∈ SN
then at most one interior equilibrium can exist and this equilibrium must be symmetric.
The obvious shortcomings of the theorem are i) it says nothing about boundary equilibria, ii)
it is impractical as determining the signs of all principal minors of a Nk × Nk-matrix is very
tedious and iii) it is quite easily violated in applications as the following example shows:4 Let
k = 1 and N = 2 and suppose that Π1(x1, x2) = x1
√
x2−1/2x21 and Π2(x1, x2) = x2
√
x1−1/2x22.
Then we have
∇F (x) =
 √x2 − x1√
x1 − x2
 S = [1/5, 2] (8)
Then
−J(x) =
 1 − 12√x2
− 12√x1 1

and |−J(x)| = 1 − 14√x1x2 which is not positive for all (x1, x2) ∈ [1/5, 2]
2. Nevertheless, the
symmetric equilibrium (1, 1) obviously is the only equilibrium.
3.1.2 The index theorem approach
The index theorem declares that, under assumption 2, we only need information about the sign
of Det (−J(x)) at critical points instead of investigating all principal minors of −J(x). Suppose
4Although Rosen’s version includes boundary equilibria (Rosen (1965)), the requirements of the payoff-function
Π are stronger (concavity), it involves checking the definitness of a large matrix and also fails to establish unique-
ness in the example below.
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all equilibria points are regular and interior. The index of a zero of the vector field ∇F (x) is
then defined by (see Vives (1999), p.48):
I(x) =
 +1 if Det(−J(x)) > 0−1 if Det(−J(x)) < 0 (9)
It is known that if the strategy space forms a rectangle in some Euclidian space then I ≡∑
x∈E
I(x) = 1 where I(x) is the index of a zero (see Simsek et al. (2007)). Hence if the boundary
condition (assumption 2) holds and all equilibria points are regular then if
∇F (x) = 0 ⇒ Det (−J(x)) > 0 (10)
holds the symmetric equilibrium is unique. Note that in example (8) the index theorem ob-
viously implies (1, 1) to be the unique equilibrium.5 The index approach may still be hard to
verify in applications as the matrix involved can be very large. Moreover, in the case of bound-
ary equilibria or non-regular equilibria6 the (standard) index theorem is not applicable7.
In the next two sections I develop the two criteria that together assert uniqueness of the sym-
metric equilibrium. I begin by discussing the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria using
the SOFA and then move on to the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
3.2 Multiplicity of symmetric equilibria
In this section, based on the SOFA, I use the index theorem to establish a criterion that rules
out the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria. The set Es of interior symmetric equilibria
is given by
Es ≡
{
(x1, ..., x1) ∈ SN : ∇Π˜ (x1) = 0
}
5The index approach is more general as univalence because condition (10) is implied if all principal minors of
−J(x) are found to be positive. Nevertheless, the Gale-Nikaido theorem is often invoked in applied work as it
asserts the global invertibility of inverse demands (Vives (1999), p. 76).
6In such a case the zeroes of the gradient field are not locally isolated which violates a prerequisite of the index
theorem (Vives, 1999, p. 362).
7Note that a generalised version of the index theorem has been proven (Simsek et al. (2007)), that can deal
with boundary equilibria. However, this approach still requires to calculate the determinant of a large matrix,
and further side conditions (non-degeneracy and complementarity) of what the authors term a generalised critical
point must be verified separately.
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where ∇Π˜ (x1) is the gradient of Π˜(x1, x¯) with respect to x1, evaluated at x¯ = x1 and
∇Π˜ (x1) : S → Rk , x1 7→ ∇Π˜ (x1) (11)
is a vector field over S. Let J˜(x1) denotes the Jacobian of ∇Π˜(x1).
Assumption 3 (Symmetric boundary and regularity) Let ∇Π˜ be the vector field as de-
fined by (11). Then
i) ∇Π˜ points inwards on the boundary of S
ii) Det
(
−J˜(x1)
)
6= 0 if ∇Π˜(x1) = 0
Proposition 3 Suppose assumption 3 is satisfied. Then all symmetric equilibria are interior
and their number is odd. Further, if and only if
∇Π˜(x1) = 0 ⇒ Det
(
−J˜(x1)
)
> 0 x1 ∈ Int(S) (12)
then there is only one symmetric equilibrium.
Proof: Follows directly from the index theorem as ∇Π˜ : S → Rk, x1 7→ ∇Π˜(x1) defines a vector
field on S.

Let Π˜i(x1) be the i-th component of ∇Π˜. The boundary condition in proposition 3 then means
that Π˜i (x11, ..., 0i, ..., x1k) > 0 and Π˜i
(
x11, ..., S¯i, ..., x1k
)
< 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Obviously, if
assumption 2 is satisfied then also assumption 3 i) holds. But assumption 2 is unnecessarily
restrictive8 because we can restrict ourselves to ∇Π˜ (rather than ∇Π1) which obviously reduces
the complexity of the task. All points that violate the boundary condition in proposition 3 are
candidates for symmetric boundary equilibria. If the boundary condition in proposition 3 fails
to hold and it is known that interior symmetric equilibria exist we may apply the univalence
approach to J˜(x1): if all principal minors of −J˜(x1) are found to be positive for all x1 ∈ S and an
interior symmetric equilibrium exists, this is the only interior symmetric equilibrium of the game.
8If assumption 2 is satisfied the index theorem can be used to obtain a counting rule that reveals more
regularities of the equilibrium set E (see 6.1 in the appendix).
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As we will see in section 4.1 there is an intimate relationship between (symmetric) stability of
symmetric equilibria and the multiplicity of such equilibria which makes the comparative statics
problematic in case of multiple symmetric equilibria. Thus from this perspective it makes sense,
as a modelling advice, to impose boundary conditions as stated by proposition 3 directly on the
symmetric opponent form of the game.
3.3 Inexistence of asymmetric equilibria
In this section I develop a sufficient criterion that excludes asymmetric equilibria from the
equilibrium set. I start with the simple case where k = 1 and then generalise the result to the
case k = 2. Finally, I illustrate how to extend the criterion to k ≥ 3.
3.3.1 The case k = 1
Suppose k = 1 and N ≥ 2. Let ϕ(x2;X) ≡ ϕ1(x2;X) where X ≡ (x3, ..., xN ). Note that because
of corollary 1 the partial derivative ∂ϕ(x2;X) ≡ ∂∂x2ϕ1(x2;X) exists if ϕ(x2;X) ∈ (0, S¯).
Theorem 2 If for all x2 ∈ (0, S¯) and any given X ∈ SN−2 for which ∂ϕ(x2;X) exists we have
that ∂ϕ(x2;X) > −1 then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof: Appendix (6.5)
Note that the shape of ϕ(x2;X) is not restricted by theorem 2 up to the slope condition for
those points (x2;X) which imply that ϕ(x2;X) ∈ (0, S¯). Hence, other than the index theorem,
we do not require any boundary conditions to hold nor do we need to exclude the possibility of
non-isolated asymmetric equilibria (i.e. theorem 2 does not require assumption 2). Moreover,
to exclude asymmetric equilibria from the equilibrium set by theorem 2 we can focus on a
two-player version of the game where the vector X of strategies of the other player enter as
exogenous parameters and the slope condition in theorem 2 is much simpler to work with than
the determinant of a N×N -matrix. A straightforward application of the IFT gives the following
sufficient condition for the inexistence of asymmetric equilibria:
Corollary 2 If for all x1, x2 ∈ (0, S¯) and any given X ∈ SN−2 we have that
Π1 (x1, x2;X) = 0 ⇒ Π12 (x1, x2;X)Π11 (x1, x2;X) < 1 (13)
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then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Note that corollary 2 means that we can exclude asymmetric boundary equilibria by considering
only interior points in a two-player game.
In the remainder of this section I provide the simple geometric intuition behind theorem 2. In
essence, it is an application of the Mean Value Theorem and the idea is illustrated in figure
1. Suppose the point A = (xa1, x
a
2) corresponds to an asymmetric equilibrium of the game, as
x2
x1
S
S
 x2
 x1
0
A
A'
x1
a
x2
a x1
a
x2
a
x2
−1
−1
Figure 1: Theorem 2
depicted in the figure. By symmetry its reflection, the point A′ = (xa2, xa1), must then also be
an asymmetric equilibrium. As is depicted in the figure the line that connects A and A′ must
have a slope of −1. The best response function of player one, ϕ(x2), remains in the interior of
S =
[
0, S¯
]
which according to corollary 1 means that this function must be differentiable for any
x2 ∈ (0, S¯). But then the Mean Value Theorem tells us that there must be a point x˜2 ∈ (xa2, xa1)
such that we have ∂ϕ(x˜2) = −1. Theorem 2 then states that if we cannot find such a point (x˜2)
we may conclude that no asymmetric equilibrium exists.9
9The complete proof (see appendix) is complicated by the fact that ϕ(x2) may be on the boundary and hence
not differentiable everywhere.
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3.3.2 The case k = 2 and N ≥ 2
I now turn to the case where k = 2. To ease notation I introduce the four symbols α, β, γ, δ
which denote the partial derivatives of the best response function of g = 1 with respect to a
strategy of player g = 2 for given (x21, x22;X) where X = (x31, x32, ..., xN1, xN2).
α ≡ ∂ϕ1(x21,x22;X)∂x21
β ≡ ∂ϕ1(x21,x22;X)∂x22
γ ≡ ∂ϕ2(x21,x22;X)∂x21
δ ≡ ∂ϕ2(x21,x22;X)∂x22
(14)
Theorem 3 If for all x2 ∈ Int(S) and any given X ∈ SN−2 for which the corresponding partial
derivatives as defined by (14) exist we have that
α > −1 δ > −1
α+ δ + αδ − βγ > −1
(15)
then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof: Appendix (6.6)
Note that corollary 2 extends in a straightforward way to the case where k = 2. Theorem 3
is not only a useful tool in order to exclude asymmetric equilibria (interior or boundary) from
the equilibrium set but it also permits to get some economically interesting insights in case of
two-dimensional games (see section 3.5.2). In the appendix (see 6.6) I illustrate that theorem 3
can be extended in a straightforward way to the case where k > 2.
3.4 Discussion
If the conditions of proposition 3 and of theorem 2 or 3 (or the higher dimensional analogue) are
satisfied, then the game only has one equilibrium, the interior symmetric equilibrium. Especially
note that we only need to examine those boundary points that could be part of a symmetric
boundary equilibrium and not the entire boundary - which is a clear practical advantage over
the index theorem approach. Moreover, the slope condition of theorem 2 (or theorem 3) are
simpler to evaluate than the index or the univalence condition as they depend only on the slope
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of the response function of an individual player with respect to a single other player and not on
the Jacobian matrix of the entire game. Similarly, the condition of proposition 3 is simple to
work with as it builds on the symmetric opponent form. Finally, as my approach to uniqueness
finds two criteria which have a functional interpretation (one excludes asymmetric equilibria, one
excludes multiple symmetric equilibria) we can also use these conditions to discuss economically
interesting equilibrium features of a particular application.
3.5 Applications and examples
To demonstrate the generality of the separation approach develop so far I show in the next
section that its application to the Cournot model generates two conditions asserting uniqueness
which are weaker than the main conditions of uniqueness as worked up by the literature. The
implications of theorem 3 for two-dimensional (supermodular) games are discussed afterwards.
3.5.1 The Cournot game
The Cournot model is one of the most analysed economic models. Let
Π1 = q1P (Q)− c(q1) Q =
N∑
i=1
qi
and qi ∈ [0, S¯] ≡ S. In accordance with assumption 1 I take P (Q), c(q1) to be twice continuously
differentiable for Q ∈ [0, NS¯] and q ∈ S with P ′(Q) < 0 as well as c′(q1) > 0 and c′′(q1) ≥ 0 and
assume strong quasiconcavity10. Then we have
∇Π˜(q) = P (Nq) + qP ′(Nq)− c′(q) (16)
The following assumption11 rules out symmetric boundary optima12
Assumption 4 (Cournot boundary conditions) The following symmetric boundary condi-
tions are imposed:
10P ′(Q)q1 + P (Q)− c′(q1) = 0 ⇒ P ′′(Q)q1 + 2P ′(Q)− c′′(q1) < 0.
11Note that this is the only boundary assumption required by the separation approach!
12If lim
q→0
P (Nq)+ qP ′(Nq) > 0 and lim
q→∞
P (Nq)+ qP ′(Nq) ≤ 0 hold and the function ξ(q) ≡ P (Nq)+ qP ′(Nq)
is differentiable on (0,∞) we can always find S > 0, S¯ <∞ such that ∇Π˜(S) > 0 and ∇Π˜(S) < 0 holds and hence
proposition 3 is applicable (as taking zero to be the lower bound of the strategy space obviously can be relaxed
in proposition 3).
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i) ∇Π˜(0) = P (0)− c′(0) > 0
ii) ∇Π˜(NS¯) = P (NS¯) + S¯P ′(NS¯)− c′(S¯) < 0
Proposition 4 (Uniqueness in Cournot) Under assumption 4 and
i) if for q ∈ (0, S¯) we have that
qP ′(Nq) + P (Nq)− c′(q) = 0 ⇒ − (qNP ′′(Nq) + P ′(Nq)(1 +N)− c′′(q)) > 0 (17)
then only one symmetric equilibrium exists, and it is an interior equilibrium,
ii) if for q1 ∈ (0, S¯) and any given Q ∈
(
0, NS¯
)
we have that
P (Q) + q1P ′(Q)− c′(q1) = 0 ⇒ P ′(Q)− c′′(q1) < 0 (18)
then no asymmetric equilibrium exists.
iii) If (17) and (18) are both satisfied, then the Cournot game only has one equilibrium, the
symmetric interior equilibrium
Proof: Appendix (6.7)
Note that by ii) we may restrict ourselves to interior points of Q in order to exclude asymmetric
(boundary) equilibria. Note that quasiconcavity does not imply that both conditions (17) and
(18) need to hold but vice-versa if the two conditions hold then the payoff-function must be
(srictly) quasiconcave at interior points.
How general are the conditions generated by the separation approach in case of the Cournot
game? The condition of uniqueness13 as worked up by Gaudet and Salant are widely accepted
as very general conditions of uniqueness (Gaudet and Salant (1991), p. 401). Usually, the
requirements that
(P ′ + q1P ′′) < 0
c′′(q1)− P ′ > 0
(19)
13If ∑
i∈M(QE)
P ′(QE) + qEi P
′′(QE)
c′′(qEi )− p′(QE)
< 1
holds, where M(QE) is the set of players for which a candidate equilibrium qEi has q
′
iE(Q
E) > 0, then only
one equilibrium exists. Note that the Gaudet-Salant condition and the separation conditions depend on different
(boundary) assumptions.
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hold is invoked in applied work (see e.g. Vives (1999), p. 98). It is not hard to see that these
conditions imply the Gaudet-Salant condition as well as the separation conditions in proposition
4. Moreover, as P ′(Q)− c′′(q1) < 0 is an exogenous assumption of Gaudet-Salant (which is not
necessarily required by the assumptions of the separation approach!), we see that precisely this
assumption excludes the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric game (on and
off the boundary). The separation conditions obviously are a lot simpler to evaluate than the
Salant-Gaudet condition. Finally, we can give the two inequalities in (19) a new interpretation as
they rule out different types of equilibria. Note that P ′′(Q) does not occur in (18). This means
that, under quasiconcavity, the curvature of P (Q) plays no role for determining whether there
are asymmetric equilibria or not. However, the curvature of P (Q) (the elasticity of P ′(Q) with
respect to q1) influences if there are multiple symmetric equilibria. In case of constant unit costs
(c′′ = 0) it is easy to see that the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric Cournot
game is rather special: a necessary condition for the existence of asymmetric equilibria in this
game is that −P ′ ≤ 0 is possible - which is contrary to the standard economic presumption of
the model.
The fact that in the Cournot N -player game we may restrict ourselves to interior points of the
aggregate quantity Q is not a coincidence but stems from the fact that the strategies of the
other players affect the payoff-function as a sum:
Corollary 3 If Π(x1, ..., xN ) = Πˆ (x1, Q), where Q ≡
N∑
j=1
xj, and Πˆ11 (x1, Q) + Πˆ12 (x1, Q) < 0
holds for any x1 ∈ (0, S¯) and Q ∈ (0, NS¯) with Πˆ1 (x1, Q)+ Πˆ2 (x1, Q) = 0, then no asymmetric
equilibrium exists.
Proof:
In such a game we have Π1(x1, ..., xN ) = Πˆ1 (x1, Q) + Πˆ2 (x1, Q), Π12 = Πˆ12 + Πˆ22 and Π11 =
Πˆ11 + 2Πˆ12 + Πˆ22. Thus the claim follows directly from corollary 2.

Note that the Cournot condition (P ′ − c′′ < 0) is just a special case of corollary 3.14
14Corollary 3 does not generally extend to the case of a general aggregative game (see Alos-Ferrer and Ania
(2005), p.500, for a definition of such games).
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3.5.2 Super- and submodular games
If k = 1 and N ≥ 2 a supermodular symmetric game has Π12(xj , x−j) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ SN whereas
a submodular game has Π12(xj , x−j) ≤ 0. Thus with theorem 2 and proposition 3 we can easily
replicate the result that supermodular games can never have any asymmetric equilibria15 but can
have multiple symmetric equilibria whereas submodular games never have multiple symmetric
equilibria but there can be asymmetric equilibria.
It is known that the inexistence result of asymmetric equilibria in supermodular games does
not extend to the case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces. That two-dimensional symmetric
supermodular games may have asymmetric equilibria has been shown to hold by means of (non-
differentiable) examples (e.g. Amir et al. (2008), p. 311). Let N = 2. From (15) we see that a
necessary condition for asymmetric equilibria to occur is that β = ∂ϕ1(x21,x22)∂x22 and γ =
∂ϕ2(x21,x22)
∂x21
are large compared to α = ∂ϕ1(x21,x22)∂x21 and δ =
∂ϕ1(x21,x22)
∂x21
. This result is intuitive as β and γ
refer to cross-over effects (e.g. how does a change of advertising intensity of my competitor affect
my pricing decision) of the strategies whereas α and δ capture the direct effects (e.g. how does a
price change of my competitor affect my pricing decision). Hence weak direct complementarity
but strong cross-over complementarity is necessarily required to generate asymmetric equilibria.
Suppose that two players play a supermodular price-advertising game as indicated above with
the property that there is a very strong cross-over but a weak direct complementarity. Now
assume that player two increases his price. This induces player one also to increase his price
and advertising but, because of the strong cross-over complementarity, he increases advertising
by more. This in turn means that player two continues to increase his price. Hence this type of
”dynamic” reinforcement intuitively explains the economically interesting result why asymmetric
”specialisation” equilibria in symmetric two-dimensional supermodular games may in fact occur.
However, if the game is supermodular (k > 1) and proposition 3 holds (such that there only is
one symmetric equilibrium) then no asymmetric equilibrium can exist.16 Hence for supermod-
ular games proposition 3 is necessary and sufficient for uniqueness of the (symmetric interior)
equilibrium.
In the case of a submodular game an evaluation of (12) shows that already for k = 2 such a
15Note that example (8) is a supermodular game. Hence the failure of the univalence approach in this example
is only driven by the fact that there could be multiple symmetric equilibria.
16This is a consequence of the fact that in supermodular symmetric games the extremal equilibria must always
be symmetric; Vives (2005), p. 448.
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game can possibly generate multiple symmetric equilibria.
Many economically interesting applications involve the case of two-dimensional strategy spaces.
We can extract some modelling advice from theorem 3 to exclude asymmetric equilibria from
the equilibrium set. Suppose that α, δ > −1 is known to hold. Especially, games were the
strategies are nested in the sense that β, γ 6= 0 are interesting as such games cannot be solved
independently for each strategy. The following properties then assert inexistence of asymmetric
equilibria (on and off the boundary) of such games:
• Either β or γ is zero at least at equilibrium candidates.17
• α, δ > 0 and |β| , |γ| ≤ 1.
• β ≥ 0 and γ ≤ 0 (or vice-versa).
Finally, it is not hard to see by using the implicit function theorem that if
Π1 (x11, x12, x21, x22;X) = 0
Π2 (x11, x12, x21, x22;X) = 0
⇒ |Πii| >
∑
j 6=i,j≤4
|Πij | i = 1, 2
holds for any (x1, x2) ∈ Int(S2) and any given X ∈ SN−2 then α, δ > −1 as well as 1+α, 1+δ >
β, γ and the game cannot have any asymmetric equilibria18.
3.5.3 Monotonic one-dimensional games
In this section I illustrate how the investigation of the equilibrium set of a symmetric game
can provide important insights into the equilibrium set of certain asymmetric variations of the
game. For simplicity, I concentrate on the case where the heterogeneity of the payoff-functions is
restricted to the distribution of one parameter, e.g. the Cournot-competitors have cost functions
c1q1, ..., cNqN . Suppose k = 1 and let the payoff-functions be Π (xg, x−g; cg), where cg ∈ [c, c¯] is
a parameter. Thus if cg 6= ch for some g 6= h we have an asymmetric game whereas if cg = ch = c
for all players the game is symmetric.
17E.g. if the best-response subfunction ϕ1 (x2, ..., xN ) depends only on the sub-strategy vector (xj1)2≤j≤N then
no asymmetric equilibrium can exist - independent of how ϕ2 depends on x−1.
18Hence if the Jacobian matrix J(x) of ∇F (x) as defined by (5) has a dominant diagonal then condition (14)
is trivially implied.
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The symmetric game
(
N,SN , {Πg(x; c)}Ng=1
)
is (strictly) monotonic on [c, c¯] if the reaction
function of each player is (strictly) monotonic in the parameter c:
c′ > c ⇒ ϕ(x−g, c′)
(>)
≥ ϕ(x−g, c)
The following proposition reveals a strong relationship between the (in)existence of asymmetric
equilibria in symmetric games and the ranking of the strategies in any equilibrium of an asym-
metric version of the game. To be precise I consider the case where c¯ ≥ c1 > c2, ..., > cN = c.
Then
(
N,SN , {Πg(x; cg)}Ng=1
)
is an asymmetric game and any future reference to the asym-
metric game refers to this game. Let the binary symmetric game be defined as the game where
players g and g + 1 play a symmetric game (cg = cg+1) where Xg ≡ x\ {xg, xg+1} ∈ SN−2 is an
exogenous vector of parameters.
Proposition 5 Suppose
(
N,SN , {Πg(x; c)}Ng=1
)
is monotonic on [c, c¯]
i) If for c = c the binary symmetric game has no asymmetric equilibrium for any given
Xg ∈ SN−2 then any equilibrium (x∗1, ..., x∗N ) of the asymmetric game has the property that
x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥, ...,≥ x∗N .
ii) If for any c ∈ [c, c¯] the binary symmetric game has no asymmetric equilibrium for any
given Xg ∈ SN−2 and the game is strictly monotonic on [c, c¯] then x∗1 > x∗2 > ... > x∗N .
iii) If for any given c ∈ [c, c¯] the interior symmetric equilibrium xs(c) is the unique equilibrium
and the game is strictly monotonic on [c, c¯] then x∗1 > x∗2 > ... > x∗N−1 > x
s(c).
Proof: Appendix (6.8)
Whether or not we even have x∗N > x
s(c) in iii) additionaly depends on the complementarity in
the (symmetric) game. If the strategies are substitutes, i.e. the reaction functions are strictly
decreasing, then we must have x∗N < x
s(c) whereas under strict complements the opposite holds.
Note that the requirement of the binary symmetric game not to have asymmetric equilibria
is precisely the condition of theorem 2 asserting that the symmetric N -player game has no
asymmetric equilibrium.
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Finally note that under differentiability the symmetric game obviously is monotonic on [c, c¯] if
and only if
∂Π(xg, x−g; c)
∂xg
= 0 ⇒ ∂
2Π(xg, x−g; c)
∂xg∂c
≥ 0 x−g ∈ SN−1, c ∈ [c, c¯]
4 Stability
In this section I discuss the connection between (local) stability and symmetric equilibria. For
example, Dastidar shows that in case of the symmetric Cournot game uniqueness of the equi-
librium and its local stability are intimately related (Dastidar (2000), p.213). By introducing
the concept of symmetric stability I show for one-dimensional games satisfying assumption 3
that local symmetric stability and the inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria are in fact
the same properties. However, for higher dimensional games stability is a stronger requirement
than non-multiplicity of symmetric equilibria. Finally, by exploiting the SOFA, I derive a con-
dition that asserts whether an interior symmetric equilibrium of a k-dimensional game is a local
contraction which is more general than the usual argument of local diagonal dominance.
4.1 Comparative statics and symmetric stability
As we consider static games, stability conditions are in any case ”without foundation” (Dixit
(1986), p. 107). Nevertheless, as Dixit highlights, there is a close link between the sign of
a comparative-static prediction and the local stability of an equilibrium. It turns out that a
modification of Dixit’s concept of local myopic stability provides a fundamental link between
stability under symmetric deviations and the (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria.
To illustrate the importance of such a consideration I reexamine the Cournot example from
section 3.4.1. I assume that assumption 3 is satisfied and work with linear costs for simplicity:
c(q1) = cq1. Let q ∈ (0, S¯) denote a symmetric interior equilibrium. Then by the implicit
function theorem:
q′(c) =
1
NP ′′(Q)q + (1 +N)P ′(Q)
(20)
We immediately recognize NP ′′(Q)q+(1+N)P ′(Q) as the relevant term in (17) that determines
whether or not there are multiple symmetric equilibria. Thus in the case of multiple symmetric
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equilibria we can get19 q′(c) > 0 at a particular equilibrium point. In such a case we must
have that strategic effects are of first-order importance, i.e. they reverse the direction of the
comparative-statics as suggested by the direct effect. To see this consider an exogenous, sym-
metric change of unit costs c. Assuming that all competitors choose the same initial response
dq¯, the change of strategy of firm one, dq1, can be determined by using the total differential of
the first-order condition of the symmetric opponents form:
(N − 1) (P ′′(Q)q1 + P ′(Q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
dq¯ +
(
P ′′(Q)q1 + 2P ′(Q)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
dq1 − dc = 0 (21)
From section 3.4.1 we know that P ′′(Q)q1+P ′(Q) > 0 is necessary for multiple interior symmetric
equilibria to exist and B < 0 follows from strong quasiconcavity. The direct effect of the c-shock
on q1,
dqD1
dc can be found by holding the competitors’ reaction fixed, i.e. dq¯ = 0. Then
dqD1
dc = 1/B
and thus dq
D
1
dc < 0. The strategic effect is
dq1
dq¯ = −A/B and corresponds to the slope of the best-
response function q1(q¯) as defined by the FOC of the symmetric opponent form. From (21) we
get that dq1dc =
1
B − AB dq¯dc . Hence in equilibrium (dq1 = dq¯ = dq):
dq
dc
=
1
B
B
A+B
=
1
A+B
Thus we have sign
(
dq
dc
)
= sign
(
dqD1
dc
)
if and only if −B > A which is equivalent to the slope
of q1(q¯) being less than one at an equilibrium point. Thus if only one symmetric equilibrium
exists then we must have that sign
(
dq
dc
)
= sign
(
dqD1
dc
)
, i.e. strategic effects are of second-order
importance (they influence only the magnitude of the change). Note that this condition is
independent of whether there are asymmetric equilibria or not. Although (local) stability under
symmetric adjustments is a restricted version of general myopic stability20 this analysis uncovers
that symmetric stability is a minimal consistency requirement for the comparative statics of a
game and the inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria asserts symmetric stability in the
Cournot example.
I now establish the link between symmetric stability and multiplicity of symmetric equilibria
more formally.
19Because proposition 3 is an index theorem result, in the case of multiple symmetric regular equilibria we must
have NP ′′(Q)q + (1 +N)P ′(Q) > 0 for at least one equilibrium point q
20A symmetric equilibrium that is stable under symmetric adjustments need not be stable under general myopic
adjustments.
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Following Dixit’s approach to stability I define the myopic adjustment process by
x˙11 = s1 ∂∂x11Π(x1, x−1)
...
x˙1k = sk ∂∂x1kΠ(x1, x−1)
...
x˙Nk = sk ∂∂xNkΠ(xN , x−N )
(22)
where s1, ..., sk > 0 are arbitrary adjustment speeds (Dixit (1986)). A solution to (22) has the
form x(t) = (xj(t))1≤j≤N , where xj(t) = (xj1(t), ..., xjk(t)) is the vector trajectory of player j.
The symmetric myopic adjustment process is a restricted version where we require the initial
values x(0) to be symmetric, i.e. xj(0) = xi(0), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Under this restriction the time
path xj(t) must be the same for all players and is the solution to
x˙11 = s1Π˜1(x1)
...
x˙1k = skΠ˜k(x1)
(23)
Let Jˆ(x1) denote the Jacobian corresponding to (23) and suppose that x = (x1, ..., x1) is an
interior symetric equilibrium. The point x is symmetrically stable (i.e. stable under symmetric
adjustments) if Jˆ(x1) only has negative eigenvalues (or eigenvalues with negative real part).
Proposition 6 Suppose that x∗ ∈ Es is locally symmetrically stable. Then there exists ε > 0
such that for any initial value x(0) on the k-dimensional symmetric manifold
M(x∗) ≡ {x ∈ SN : xi = xj ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N} ∩ B (x∗, ε)
the system (22) has a uniques solution with x(t)→ x∗.
Proof: Appendix (6.9)
Figure 2 illustrates the relastionship between stability and symmetric stability in the simplest
possible case ((k,N) = (1, 2)).
If λ = (λ1, ..., λk) are the eigenvalues of Jˆ(x∗1), then λ must also be eigenvalues of Jˆ(x∗), the
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Figure 2: Generally stable eq. (left) and only symmetrically stable eq.
Jacobian corresponding to (22) (see appendix 6.9). Consequently, if λ consists only of eigenval-
ues with negative real part then Jˆ(x∗) must have at least k eigenvalues with negative real part
and, by the saddle path theorem, there exists a k-dimensional manifold about x∗ on which x(t)
converges to x∗. Proposition 6 shows that this manifold simply takes on the form of a symmet-
ric (topological) subspace about the equilibrium x∗. This makes clear why the requirement of
symmetric stability, rather than the stronger requirement of general myopic stability, is reason-
able if the (symmetric) comparative-statics of the symmetric equilibrium are to be investigated.
Suppose we initially are at a symmetric equilibrium x∗ and that a set of parameters of the game
change identically for all players (e.g. all players get access to the same cheaper production
technology). Then the reaction functions shift according to this change and, assuming that a
new symmetric equilibrium x∗∗ exists, the former equilibrium is an initial value for the dynamic
system (22) of the new equilibrium at the moment of the change: x(0) = x∗. If the change is
sufficiently small (such that x∗ ∈M(x∗∗)) then, by proposition 6, we have that x(t)→ x∗∗.
The following proposition reveals the relationship between symmetric stability and (non)-multiplicity
of symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 7 (Symmetric stability and uniqueness) Suppose that assumption 3 is sat-
isfied. Then the following statements hold:
i) If for k ≥ 1 multiple symmetric equilibria exist, then there must be (symmetrically) unstable
23
symmetric equilibria.
ii) If for k = 2 we have that
∇Π˜(x1) = 0 ⇒ Π˜11(x1), Π˜22(x1) < 0, Det
(
J˜(x1)
)
> 0 (24)
then there only is one symmetric equilibrium and it is locally symmetrically stable.
iii) For k = 1 the following statements are equivalent:
(a) All symmetric equilibria are locally symmetrically stable
(b) There only exists one symmetric equilibrium
(c) Strategic effects are of second-order importance at symmetric equilibrium points:
sign
(
x′1(c)
)
= sign
(
∂
∂c
Π˜1(x1, c)
)
Moreover, if x is a symmetrically stable equilibrium with Π11(x) < Π12(x) then x is a
stable equilibrium.
Proof: Appendix (6.10)
An immediate consequence of i) is that at any symmetrically stable equilibrium we must have
Det(−J˜(x1∗)) > 0 (i.e. x∗1 has a positive index). Further, we see that symmetric stability and
non-multiplicity of symmetric equilibria are the same properties of one-dimensional games. In
such games, instability of an equilibrium can be caused only by dominant aggregate strategic
effects. This close connection between non-multiplicity and stability generally breaks down in
higher dimensions, although non-multiplicity is a necessary21 condition for symmetric stability
(and hence also for general myopic stability). Hence stability is a stronger concept than unique-
ness (see proposition 8 below) and not much can be said in general concerning the relationship
between stability and the sign of the comparative statics. However, as argued above the require-
ment of a symmetric interior equilibrium x∗ to be at least stable under symmetric adjustments
is a reasonable prerequirement for comparative statics and also puts
The following condition is sufficient for symmetric stability and uniqueness22 for any k ≥ 1:
21It should be noted that for k > 1 non-multiplicity of symmetric equilibria generally is not sufficient for local
symmetric stability.
22In the literature many different sufficient conditions for stability have been proposed. See Tang et al. (2007)
for a modern survey on matrix stability.
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Proposition 8 (Sufficient condition for symmetric stability) If the symmetric matrix
Mˆ(x1) ≡ −
(
Jˆ(x1) + Jˆ(x1)T
)
is positive definite for any choice of s1, ..., sk > 0 then x =
(x1, ..., x1) is a locally symmetrically stable equilibrium. Further, if
∇Π˜(x1) = 0 ⇒ Mˆ(x1) positive definite
then there only is one symmetric equilibrium and it is locally symmetrically stable.
Proof: Appendix 6.11
In the case of supermodular games the sufficient condition for stability becomes particularly
simple:
Proposition 9 (Symmetric stability in supermodular games) If the game is supermod-
ular and for ∇Π˜(x1) = 0 we have that all principal minors of −J˜(x1) are positive then x =
(x1, ..., x1) is a locally symmetrically stable equilibrium point.
Proof: Appendix 6.12
4.2 Local contraction stability
In the literature on stability also discrete (or iterative) adjustment processes have been consid-
ered. I present a condition for an equilibrium to be a local contraction that depends only on the
symmetric opponent form which should provide useful in applications and is more general than
the requirement of diagonal dominance if k > 1.
Let ϕ˜i(x¯) denote the i-th component of the k-vector ϕ˜(x¯) as introduced in section 2.1 and
x¯ = (x¯1, ..., x¯k) ∈ S.
Theorem 4 Suppose x∗ ∈ Es. If
max
1≤i≤k

k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ˜i(x¯∗)∂x¯j
∣∣∣∣
 < 1 (25)
then there exists ε > 0 such that φ(x) is a contraction on V ≡ B¯(x, ε).
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Proof: Appendix (6.13)
In words, condition (25) means that, for any subfunction i, the sum of the absolute values of the
partial derivatives23 with respect to the symmetric opponent k-vector x¯ must be less than one.
It should be noted that this approach to stability puts no restriction on the initial deviations of
the players other than they must be in the contraction basin V (i.e. close to the equilibrium). In
particular, initial deviations need not be symmetric. This is somewhat remarkable as condition
(25) only makes use of the symmetric opponent form, i.e. we do not have to work with the entire
payoff-function which considerably simplifies the analysis for higher dimensional games or games
with complicated payoff-functions. Moreover, by using the IFT, condition (25) should be simpler
to evaluate in higher-dimensional applications than the corresponding myopic stability condition
on the eigenvalues of J(x). For example, in two-dimensional games we only need to calculate
the four partial derivatives corresponding to the symmetric opponent form (irrespective of the
number of players!) whereas myopic stability requires to examine the eigenvalues of a (generally
non-symmetric) 2N × 2N -matrix.
The usual sufficient condition for φ to be a contraction is that the Jacobian J(x) has a dominant
diagonal (e.g. Vives (1999), 1999, p. 47). For k = 1 diagonal dominance and (25) are the same
requirement. If k > 1 then it is not hard to find an example (see 6.13 in the appendix) that
shows condition (25) to be more general than the requirement of a dominant diagonal.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a comparably simple approach to uniqueness by deriving two crite-
ria which together assert uniqueness of the interior symmetric equilibrium of a differentiable
symmetric game with compact strategy space. One criterion excludes the possibility of multi-
ple symmetric equilibria and one criterion excludes the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. I
demonstrated the generality of my approach by applying it to the Cournot game. Further, I
have used the criterion that deals with asymmetric equilibria to learn more about what general
properties of symmetric two-dimensional games can exclude asymmetric equilibria (on or off
the boundary) from the equilibrium set. An application of my approach to asymmetric games
revelas that certain equilibrium properties of asymmetric games may be found by investigat-
23In applications, these derivatives can be calculated directly from the equilibrium condition ∇Π˜(x1, x¯) = 0 by
a direct application of the Implicit Function Theorem.
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ing the underlying symmetric game. Finally, the connection between multiplicity of symmetric
equilibria and symmetric stability has been discussed and a condition for an interior symmetric
equilibrium to be a local contraction was developed that is more general than the standard
requirement of a dominant diagonal.
6 Appendix
6.1 A counting rule
Suppose assumption 2 is satisfied (so that only interior equilibria exist) and all equilibrium points
are regular. If xa is an asymmetric equilibrium then by the permutation-invariance property of
∇F for every possible alignment x˜a of the vectors (xa1, ..., xaN ) of xa we must have that x˜a also is
an asymmetric equilibrium. Thus it makes sense to introduce the notion of a distinct asymmetric
equilibrium. Let (x1, x2, ..., xN ) , (x1′, x2′, ..., x′N ) ∈ SN denote two asymmetric equilibria. Then
these are distinct asymmetric equilibria if they are not permutations of each other.
Proposition 10 Suppose assumption 2 is satisfied and all equilibria points are regular. Let Is
denote the sum of the indices of all symmetric equilibria on the field of ∇F defined in (7).
1) If Is = 1, then if there are asymmetric equilibria
i) if N ≥ 2 there must be more than one distinct asymmetric equilibrium
ii) if N = 2 there must be an even number of distinct asymmetric equilibria
2) If Is 6= 1 and N ≥ 2 then asymmetric equilibria exist. If especially N = 2 then
i) if Is = 3 + 4z for z ∈ Z then there must be an odd number of distinct asymmetric
equilibria
ii) if Is = 5 + 4z for z ∈ Z\ {−1} then there must be an even number of distinct
asymmetric equilibria
Proof:
Because all equilibrium points are regular every equilibrium point has a well defined index which
is either +1 or −1 (see (9)). Let ω ≥ 1 be the number of symmetric equilibria which is odd by
proposition 3. Then Is must be a number from {±1,±3,±5, ...,±ω}. Let Ia denote the index
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sum of all asymmetric equilibria. Then we must have Is + Ia = 1 because SN is a rectangle24.
If Is = 1 but there are asymmetric equilibria then Ia = 0 which requires at least two distinct
asymmetric equilibria because all non-distinct asymmetric equilibria must have the same index.
This proves 1) i). If Is 6= 1 we must have Is 6= 0 which proves that asymmetric equilibria must
exist.
To see the rest set N = 2 and note that with N = 2 non-distinct asymmetric equilibria can
only appear pairwise. Let n1 denote the number of distinct asymmetric equilibria with index
−1 and n2 those with index +1. Then the index theorem implies that n2 − n1 = 1−Is2 . Now, if
Is is a number 3 + 4z the RHS of this equation is an odd number which means that either n1
or n2 must be odd and the other number must be even or zero. Consequently, n1 + n2 must be
odd. For Is = 5+4z with z ∈ Z\ {−1} the RHS must be even and hence n1+n2 must be even.
Finally, if Is = 1 we must have n2 = n1 = n. If n > 0 then this implies n1 + n2 = 2n which
always is even.

6.2 Proof of proposition 1
Let ϕ (x−g) denote the set of maximisers of player g from problem (2). Then ϕ(x−g) is non-
empty by the continuity of Π and the compactness of S . Moreover, ϕ(x−g) is single-valued for
each feasible x−g because of the strict quasiconcavity of Π in xg and the convexity of S. Finally,
the continuity of Π implies the continuity of ϕ(x−g) which, by symmetry, implies the continuity
of φ. For the second claim note that Π˜ (x1, x¯) is continuous and strongly quasiconcave in x1 by
the properties of Π1. Hence the best-response function ϕ˜(x¯) ≡ ϕ (x¯−1) exists, is continuous and
a mapping from S to itself. The result then follows from the Brouwer FPT.

6.3 Proof of proposition 2
First note that because Πg is C2 for g = 1, ..., N the gradient field ∇F is well-defined. Because of
symmetry we can concentrate on player g = 1 without loss of generality. Let x = (x1, x−1) and
suppose x1 ∈ ∂S, i.e. for at least one x1i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have that x1i ∈
{
0, S¯i
}
. If x1i = 0
24A rectangle has an Euler characteristic of one which must correspond to the index sum of the vector field on
the rectangle (see Simsek et al. (2007)).
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then the boundary condition implies Πi(x1, x−1) > 0 as otherwise the gradient field would not
point inwards at x. Similarly, if x1i = S¯i then Πi(x1, x−1) < 0. Suppose now that x∗ = (x∗1, x∗−1)
is an equilibrium with x∗1 ∈ ∂S. Hence for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ k we must have x∗1i ∈
{
0, S¯i
}
.
If x∗1i = 0 then by the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions we must have Πi
(
x∗1, x∗−1
) ≤ 0 which
contradicts the boundary condition. If x∗1i = S¯i then Πi
(
x∗1, x∗−1
) ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence
only interior equilibria exist which proves i). For ii) note that E is bounded and because of the
continuity of φ (see proposition 1 i)) also closed. Because Det(J(x)) 6= 0 at every x ∈ E all
equilibrium points are locally unique by the inverse function theorem. As E is compact and
discrete (all points locally isolated) E must be finite.

6.4 Proof of corollary 1
Suppose that ϕ(x−g) ∈ Int(S). Then we must have ∇Πg (x1, ..., ϕ(x−g), ..., xN ) = 0. Strong
quasiconcavity of Πg and the fact that Πg ∈ C2 imply
∇Πg (x1, ..., ϕ(x−g), ..., xN ) = 0 ⇒ Det
(
D2xg (Π
g (x1, ..., ϕ(x−g), ..., xN ))
)
6= 0
where D2xg denotes the Jacobian of ∇Πg with respect to xg. Hence by the Implicit Function
Theorem we may conclude that ϕ(x−g) is differentiable at x−g.

6.5 Proof of theorem 2
The proofs of theorems 2 and 3 require the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let ψ ∈ C ([0, 1], [0, S¯]) with ψ(0) 6= ψ(1) and
ψ(t) ∈ (0, S¯) ⇒ ψ differentiable at t
Then:
(i) if ψ(0) > ψ(1) ∃t′ ∈ (0, 1) such that −ψ′(t′) ≥ ψ(0)− ψ(1)
(ii) if ψ(0) < ψ(1) ∃t′′ ∈ (0, 1) such that ψ′(t′′) ≥ ψ(1)− ψ(0)
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Proof: I first proove (i).
Suppose that ψ(0) > ψ(1). Hence ψ(0) > 0 and ψ(1) < S¯. Define T ≡ ψ−1 ({0, S¯}).
Case 1: T = ∅
As ψ is differentiable on (0, 1) and continuous on [0, 1] the MVT implies that ∃t ∈ (0, 1) such
that −ψ′(t) = ψ(0)− ψ(1).
Case 2: T 6= ∅
Obviously, T is bounded. Because
{
0, S¯
}
is closed and ψ is continuous T also is closed and thus
a compact subset of R. Hence the min and max of T exist and are denoted by t, t¯. The proof
now is a case-by-case examination.
(a) ψ(t) = 0. Then ψ is continuous on the perfect interval [0, t] and differentiable on (0, t).
Thus by the MVT ∃t ∈ (0, t) such that
ψ′(t) =
ψ(0)− ψ(t)
−t ≤
ψ(0)− ψ(1)
−1
(b) ψ(t) = S¯ and ψ(t¯) = S¯. Then ψ is continuous on the perfect interval [t¯, 1] and differentiable
on (t¯, 1). By the MVT ∃t ∈ (t¯, 1) such that
ψ′(t) =
ψ(t¯)− ψ(1)
t¯− 1 ≤
ψ(0)− ψ(1)
−1
(c) ψ(t) = S¯ and ψ(t¯) = 0. Define A ≡ ψ−1 ({S¯}), which is a non-empty and compact
set. Hence tˆ = maxA exists. Consider B ≡ [tˆ, 1] ∩ ψ−1 ({0}), which also is non-empty
and compact. Let tˇ = minB. Hence ψ is continuous on the perfect interval [tˆ, tˇ] and
differentiable on (tˆ, tˇ). Thus by the MVT ∃t ∈ (tˆ, tˇ) such that
ψ′(t) =
ψ(tˆ)− ψ(tˇ)
tˆ− tˇ ≤
ψ(0)− ψ(1)
−1
Hence (i) is true and (ii) follows from (i) by setting ρ(z) ≡ ψ(1− t).

Proof of theorem 2
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Step 1: N = 2
Suppose that xa1, x
a
2 are asymmetric equilibria with the property that ϕ(x
a
2) = x
a
1 and ϕ(x
a
1) = x
a
2.
Let ψ(t) ≡ ϕ1 (xa1 + t(xa2 − xa1)) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then ψ(0) = xa2 and ψ(1) = xa1. Because
ψ(0) 6= ψ(1) lemma 1 together with proposition 1 (i) and corollary 1 asserts that there exists
t′ ∈ (0, 1) such that either ψ′(t′) ≤ ψ(1)− ψ(0) or ψ′(t′) ≥ ψ(1)− ψ(0). In the first case we get
(by the chain rule) that ∂ϕ · (ψ(0)− ψ(1)) ≤ ψ(1)− ψ(0) where ψ(1)− ψ(0) < 0, which implies
∂ϕ(x2) ≤ −1 for some x2 ∈ (0, S¯). In the second case we get ∂ϕ · (ψ(0)− ψ(1)) ≥ ψ(1)− ψ(0)
where ψ(1)− ψ(0) > 0. Consequently, again ∂ϕ(x2) ≤ −1 for some x2 ∈ (0, S¯).
Step 2: N > 2
Suppose xa ∈ SN is an asymmetric equilibrium. Because of symmetry we can set xa =
(xa1, x
a
2, x
a
3, ..., x
a
N ) with x
a
1 6= xa2. Suppose players g = 1 and g = 2 play a parametrised
two-player game where X = (x3, ..., xN ) ∈ SN−2 is an exogenous vector of parameters. If
we choose X = (xa3, ..., x
a
N ) then (x
a
1, x
a
2) as well as (x
a
2, x
a
1) must be asymmetric equilibria of
the parametrised two-player game. Thus, by step 1, if an asymmetric equilibrium exists we can
always find X ∈ SN−2 and x2 ∈ (0, S¯) such that ∂ϕ(x2;X) ≤ −1 - which is the contraposition
of theorem 2.

6.6 Proof of theorem 3
The proof will make use of the following fact: If r1, r2, s1, s2 ∈ R with r1 ≤ s1 ≤ 0 and r2 ≤ s2 ≤ 0
then r1r2 ≥ s1s2.
Let N = 2 and suppose an asymmetric equilibrium xa1 = (x
a
11, x
a
12) ∈ S exists. Then because of
symmetry xa2 = (x
a
21, x
a
22) also is an asymmetric equilibrium where ϕ(x
a
2) = x
a
1 and ϕ(x
a
1) = x
a
2
and xa1 6= xa2. Define ψ1(t1) ≡ ϕ1 (xa1 + t1(xa2 − xa1)) and ψ2(t2) ≡ ϕ2 (xa1 + t2(xa2 − xa1)) for
t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then ψ1(0) = ϕ1(xa1), ψ1(1) = ϕ1(xa2), ψ2(0) = ϕ2(xa1) and ψ2(1) = ϕ2(xa2).
Moreover, ψi ∈ C
(
[0, 1], [0, S¯i]
)
for i = 1, 2 and also
ψi(ti) ∈
(
0, S¯i
) ⇒ ψi differentiable at ti for i=1,2
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by corollary 1. Then, assuming that the corresponding partial derivative exist, by the chain rule
we have for i = 1:
ψ1
′(t1) = α (xa1 + t1(x
a
2 − xa1)) (ψ1(0)− ψ1(1)) + β (xa1 + t1(xa2 − xa1)) (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1))
and for i = 2:
ψ2
′(t2) = γ (xa1 + t2(x
a
2 − xa1)) (ψ1(0)− ψ1(1)) + δ (xa1 + t2(xa2 − xa1)) (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1))
Case 1: ϕi(xa1) = ϕi(x
a
2) for i = 1, 2.
Suppose that ϕ1(xa1) = ϕ1(x
a
2). Hence ψ1(0) = ψ1(1). Then ϕ2(x
a
1) 6= ϕ2(xa2). According to
lemma 1 there exists t′ ∈ (0, 1) such that either ψ2′(t′) ≤ ψ2(1)−ψ2(0) or ψ2′(t′) ≥ ψ2(1)−ψ2(0).
In the first case we get δ · (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1)) ≤ ψ2(1) − ψ2(0) where ψ2(1) − ψ2(0) < 0, which
implies that ∃(x21, x22) ∈ Int(S) such that δ(x21, x22) ≤ −1. In the second case we get
δ · (ψ2(0)− ψ2(1)) ≥ ψ2(1)− ψ2(0) where ψ2(1)− ψ2(0) > 0. Consequently, again ∃(x21, x22) ∈
Int(S) such that δ(x21, x22) ≤ −1. Finally, if instead ϕ21(xa1) = ϕ21(xa2) then a similar argument
gives that α ≤ −1 for some (x21, x22) ∈ Int(S).
From now on suppose that ϕi(xa1) 6= ϕi(xa2) for i = 1, 2 and define m ≡ ψ2(0)−ψ2(1)ψ1(0)−ψ1(1) .
Case 2.1: ϕi(xa1) > ϕi(x
a
2) for i = 1, 2.
Then we have ψi(0) > ψi(1) for i = 1, 2 and ∃ti ∈ (0, 1) such that ψi′(ti) ≤ ψi(1)− ψi(0) which
implies
α+mβ ≤ −1
γ 1m + δ ≤ −1
Suppose that α, δ ≥ −1 ∀ (x21, x22) ∈ Int(S) for which the corresponding derivative exists.
Then
mβ ≤ −(1 + α) ≤ 0
γ 1m ≤ −(1 + δ) ≤ 0
and the above fact implies that ∃(x21, x22), (x′21, x′22) ∈ Int(S) such that
β(x21, x22)γ(x′21, x
′
22) ≥ (1 + α(x21, x22))(1 + δ(x′21, x′22))
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Case 2.2: ϕi(xa1) < ϕi(x
a
2) for i = 1, 2.
Then we have ψi(0) < ψi(1) for i = 1, 2 and ∃ti ∈ (0, 1) such that ψi′(ti) ≥ ψi(1)− ψi(0) which
implies
α+mβ ≤ −1
γ 1m + δ ≤ −1
and a similar argument as in case 2.1 shows that βγ ≥ (1 +α)(1 + δ) must be true if α, δ ≥ −1.
Case 2.3: ϕ1(xa1) < ϕ1(x
a
2) and ϕ2(x
a
1) > ϕ2(x
a
2) for i = 1, 2.
Hence ψ1(0) < ψ1(1) and ψ2(0) > ψ2(1) and there exist t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1) such that ψ1′(t1) ≥
ψ1(1)− ψ1(0) and ψ2′(t2) ≤ ψ2(1)− ψ2(0). Consequently, we get
mβ ≤ −(1 + α) ≤ 0
γ 1m ≤ −(1 + δ) ≤ 0
and a similar argument as in case 2.1 shows that βγ ≥ (1 +α)(1 + δ) must be true if α, δ ≥ −1.
Case 2.4: ϕ1(xa1) > ϕ1(x
a
2) and ϕ2(x
a
1) < ϕ2(x
a
2) is treated similarly to case 2.3.
Thus if an asymmetric equilibrium exists we can always find interior points such that α ≤ −1,
δ ≤ −1 or (1 + α)(1 + δ) ≤ βγ and the statement of theorem 3 simply is the contraposition of
this result.
The proof is concluded by noting that for N > 2 if condition (15) holds for any given parameter
vector X ∈ SN−2 then, by the proof of theorem 2, there cannot be any asymmetric equilibrium
in the game.

Remark: By defining
A ≡
 1 + ∂ϕ1∂x21 ∂ϕ1∂x22
∂ϕ2
∂x21
1 + ∂ϕ2∂x22

condition (15) of theorem 3 can be compactly written as the requirement that all principal minors
of A be equal or greater than zero. Theorem 3 naturally can be extended to the case where k > 2.
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To illustrate this suppose that N = 2 and xa1 and x
a
2 are two different asymmetric equilibria
with ϕ(xa1) = x
a
2 and ϕ(x
a
2) = x
a
1. For simplicity, assume that ϕ(x
a
1 + t(x
a
2 − xa1)) ∈ Int(S)
for t ∈ (0, 1). Then the mean value theorem asserts the existence of k vectors xi2 ∈ Int(S),
1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that
A˜

∆1
...
∆k
 = −

∆1
...
∆k
 (26)
where A˜ is a k × k-matrix with aij = ∂ϕi(x
i
2)
∂x2j
and ∆i ≡ xa2i − xa1i. But (26) is equivalent to
(
I + A˜
)
∆1
...
∆k
 = A

∆1
...
∆k
 = 0 (27)
where
A =

1 + ∂ϕ1∂x21
∂ϕ1
∂x22
· · · ∂ϕ1∂x2k
∂ϕ2
∂x21
1 + ∂ϕ2∂x22 · · ·
∂ϕ2
∂x2k
...
...
. . .
...
∂ϕk
∂x21
· · · · · · 1 + ∂ϕk∂x2k

Because xa1 and x
a
2 are different asymmetric equilibria we must have ∆i 6= 0 for at least one i.
Consequently, we must have rank(A) < k in (27) and hence Det(A) = 0. Now suppose that
∆k = 0. Then (27) implies that
Ak−1

∆1
...
∆k−1
 = 0
where Ak−1 is formed from A by cancelling the k-th row and column. Hence Det(Ak−1) = 0,
where Det(Ak−1) is a principal minor of order k − 1 of A. Obviously, if ∆j = 0 for any
j = 1, ..., k then the corresponding principal minor of order k − 1 of A must be zero. This
argument may be continued up to the case that k−1 of the k ∆i’s are zero and we find that this
corresponds to the fact that at least one principal minor of A is equal to zero if an asymmetric
equilibrium exists. Consequently, if we can show that all principal minors of A are positive we
may conclude that no interior asymmetric equilibria nor asymmetric equilibria on the boundary
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with ϕ(xa1 + t(x
a
2 − xa1)) ∈ Int(S) for t ∈ (0, 1) can exist. A somewhat tedious case-by-case
examination as in the proof of theorem 3 shows that if ϕ(xa1 + t(x
a
2 −xa1)) /∈ Int(S) for t ∈ (0, 1)
we can always find x12, ..., x
k
2 ∈ Int(S) such that at least one principal minor of A is equal or less
than zero.
6.7 Proof of proposition 4
(a) Applying (12) to (16) gives (17).
(b) From
Π1 (q1, q2; q3, ..., qN ) = P
q1 + n∑
j=2
qj
+ q1P ′
q1 + n∑
j=2
qj
− c′(q1) = 0
we get
Π12
Π11
=
P ′(Q) + q1P ′′(Q)
2P ′(Q) + q1P ′′(Q)− c′′(q1)
and the claim follows from corollary 2.
(c) Obvious.

6.8 Proof of proposition 5
The proof of proposition 8 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Characterisation of asymmetric equilibria) In a symmetric one-dimensional
two-player game no asymmetric equilibria exist if and only if
ϕ1
(
ϕ2(x1)
)
> x1 ∀x1 ∈ S with ϕ2(x1) > x1. (28)
Proof:
”⇒”. If (x1, x2) is an asymmetric equilibrium then x1 6= x2 and ϕ1
(
ϕ2(x1)
)
= x1. Hence if (28)
holds then no asymmetric equilibrium can exist.
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”⇐”. The proof of this direction naturally is more involved and requires the following additional
notation. Let G1 ≡
{
(x1, x2) ∈ S2 : ϕ1(x2) = x1
}
and G2 ≡
{
(x1, x2) ∈ S2 : ϕ2(x1) = x2
}
de-
note the graphs of the best-response functions of the two players. Further, G1(x2) ≡
(
ϕ1(x2), x2
)
and G2(x1) ≡
(
x1, ϕ
2(x1)
)
deonze specific points on the graphs. Define the lower and the upper
area of the graph of player j = 2 as
GL2 ≡
{
(x1, x2) ∈ S2 : x2 ≤ ϕ2(x1)
}
GU2 ≡
{
(x1, x2) ∈ S2 : x2 ≥ ϕ2(x1)
}
Note that GL2 , G
U
2 are closed in S
2 as G2(x1) is a continuous function.
Suppose that ∃ xˆ1 ∈ S with ϕ2(xˆ1) ≡ xˆ2 > xˆ1 and ϕ1
(
ϕ2(xˆ1)
) ≤ xˆ1. If ϕ1 (ϕ2(xˆ1)) = xˆ1 there
is nothing to proof so suppose that ϕ1
(
ϕ2(xˆ1)
)
< xˆ1. Let R ⊂ S2 be definde by R ≡ S× [0, xˆ1].
Case 1: Es ∩R = ∅.
If G1(xˆ2 ∈ Int
(
GU2
)
then as G1(0) ∈ GL2 and G1(x2) as well as G2(x1) are continuous functions
∃ x2 ∈ (0, xˆ2) such that G1(x2) ∈ G2 |R . Hence an intersection of G1 and G2 in R exists which,
by presupposition, cannot be symmetric.
If G1(xˆ2 ∈ Int
(
GL2
)
then as G1(S¯) ∈ GU2 ∃ x2 ∈ (xˆ2, S¯] such that G1(x2) ∈ G2 |R . Again, this
intersection must be an asymmetric equilibrium.
Case 2: Es ∩R 6= ∅.
Let x∗ ≡ max {Es ∩R}. We always have xs < xˆ1. Because ϕ2(xˆ1) > xˆ1 we can assume wlog
that
ϕ2(x1) > x1 ∀x1 ∈ (xs, xˆ1) (29)
as otherwise by the continuity of G2(x1) and ϕ2(xˆ1) > xˆ1 together imply the existence of a
further symmetric equilibrium in {Es ∩R} contradicting the maximality of xs.
By symmetry and continuity of the best-response function, we can find a (sufficiently small)
ε > 0 such that ϕ1(xs + ε) > xs + ε but ϕ1(xs + ε) < xˆ1. But then (29) implies
ϕ2
(
ϕ1(xs + ε)
)
> ϕ1(xs + ε) > xs + ε
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Hence G1 (xs + ε) ∈ Int
(
GL2
)
. But then the same argumentation as in case 1 immediately shows
that ∃ x2 ∈ (xs, S¯) such that G1(x2) ∈ G2 |R . Thus a further intersection of the graphs must
exist which cannot be symmetric.

Proof of proposition 5:
i) If the binary symmetric game with cg = cg+1 = c has no asymmetric equilibria for a given
Xg then because of lemma 2
ϕg
(
ϕg+1 (xg;Xg, c) ;Xg, c
)
> xg for xg ∈ S with ϕg+1 (xg;Xg, c) > xg (30)
But then the monotonicity property implies that ∀c ∈ (c, c¯] we must have
ϕg
(
ϕg+1 (xg;Xg, c) ;Xg, c
) ≥ ϕg (ϕg+1 (xg;X, c) ;Xg, c)
Because of (30) this gives
ϕg
(
ϕg+1 (xg;Xg, c) ;Xg, c
)
> xg
for ϕg+1 (xg;Xg, c) > xg. Thus for any given Xg the binary asymmetric game can only
have equilibria with xg(Xg, cg) ≥ xg+1(Xg, cg+1). As this statement must hold for any
1 ≤ g ≤ N − 1 the asymmetric game can only have equilibria with x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥, ...,≥ x∗N .
ii) Because of i) we have x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥, ...,≥ x∗N . Strict monotonicity means that
c′ > c ⇒ ϕg(x−g, c′) > ϕg(x−g, c) (31)
for any c, c′ ∈ [c, c¯]. Now suppose that x∗ is an equilibrium of the asymmetric game such
that x∗g = x∗g+1 = xsg. Hence we must have
ϕg(xsg;X
∗
g , cg) = ϕ
g+1(xsg;X
∗
g , cg+1) = ϕ
g(xsg;X
∗
g , cg+1)
which contradicts (31) as cg > cg+1.
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iii) From ii) we have x∗1 > x∗2 > ... > x∗N . If we consider the asymmetric binary game between
players N − 1 and N for given X∗N−1 we see that because
ϕN−1(xs(c);X∗N−1, cN−1) > ϕ
N−1(xs(c);X∗N−1, c)
xs(c) cannot be an equilibrium of this game. Hence we must have x∗N−1 > x
s(c).

6.9 Proof of proposition 6
Suppose that x∗ ∈ Es is localy symmetrically stable. For simplicity, the norm in use is ‖·‖∞ but
any other norm also works. Thus ∃ ε > 0 such that ∀ x1(0) ∈ B(x∗1, ε) we have that x1(t)→ x∗1.
Hence if x(0) ∈ M we have x(0) = (x1(0), ..., x1(0)) and x1(0) ∈ B(x∗1, ε). Consequently, ∀
x(0) ∈M we have that x(t)→ x∗.

The spectrum of Jˆ(x∗1) is a subset of the spectrum of Jˆ(x∗). To see this suppose that λ is
an eigenvalue of Jˆ(x∗1), i.e. Jˆ(x∗1)cˆ = λcˆ for a cˆ 6= 0. Then λ also is eigenvalue of Jˆ(x∗) iff
DJˆ(x∗)c = λDc for a c 6= 0 and any given Nk × Nk matrix D. Note that Jˆ(x∗) takes on the
form
Jˆ(x∗) =

F F¯ F¯ · · · F¯
F¯ F F¯ · · · F¯
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
F¯ F¯ F¯ F

where F ≡ ∂2Π1(x∗)
∂x1∂xT1
denotes the Hessian of Π1 with respect to x1 and F¯ ≡ ∂
2Π1(x∗)
∂x1∂xTg
is the matrix
of second derivatives of Π1 with respect to xg with g 6= 1. But if D is the partioned matrix
D =

Ik · · · Ik
· · · · · · · · ·
Ik · · · Ik

38
then DJˆ(x∗) is a partitioned matrix with F+(N−1)F¯ in every partition. But as F+(N−1)F¯ =
Jˆ(x∗1) we have
DJˆ(x∗)c = λDc c =

cˆ
0
...
0
 6= 0
Hence λ also belongs to the spectrum of Jˆ(x∗).
6.10 Proof of proposition 7
i) Let E1 ≡
{
x1 ∈ Int(S) : ∇Π˜(x1) = 0
}
and suppose that E1 is multi-valued. Then be-
cause of proposition 3 there must exist x1 ∈ E1 such that Det(−J˜(x1)) < 0. Because
Det
(
−Jˆ(x1)
)
= s1 · ... · sk ·Det
(
−J˜(x1)
)
we also have Det
(
−Jˆ(x1)
)
< 0. Let λ1, ..., λk
denote the eigenvalues of −Jˆ(x1). Then
k∏
i=1
λk < 0, which implies that there must ex-
ist at least one negative eigenvalue. Consequently, Jˆ(x1) must have at least one positive
eigenvalue which means that x = (x1, ..., x1) is an unstable equilibrium.
ii) Inexistence of multiple symmetric equilibria is obvious. Let λ1, λ2 denote the eigenvalues
of Jˆ(x1). Then, because s1, s2 > 0, (24) implies:
λ1 + λ2 = Trace
(
Jˆ(x1)
)
= s1Π˜11 + s2Π˜22 < 0
λ1λ2 = Det
(
Jˆ(x1)
)
= s1s2Det
(
J˜(x1)
)
> 0
which implies that λ1, λ2 must either be negative or have negative real parts.
iii) (a) ⇔ (b) follows as Det
(
Jˆ(x1)
)
, Det
(
J˜(x1)
)
< 0 holds iff Π˜11(x1) < 0 for x1 ∈ E1.
To see (b) ⇔ (c) note that from Π˜1(x1, x¯, c) = 0 we have that
x1
′(c) = −
∂
∂cΠ˜1
Π11
− Π12(N − 1)
Π11
x¯′(c)
where the first term is the direct effect and the second term the strategic effect. Because
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in equilibrium (x′1(c) = x¯′(c))
x1
′(c) = −
∂
∂cΠ˜1
Π11
Π11
Π11 + (N − 1)Π12 = −
∂
∂cΠ˜1
Π˜11
we see that sign (x1′(c)) = sign
(
∂
∂cΠ˜1
)
, i.e. strategic effects are of second-order impor-
tance, iff Π˜11(x1) < 0.
To see the last claim note that a symmetric equilibrium point x is locally stable under
(general) myopic adjustments iff the symmetric N ×N -matrix
J(x) =

Π11 Π12 Π12 Π12
Π12 Π11 Π12 · · · Π12
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Π12 Π12 · · · Π12 Π11

is negative definite. This is the case iff
Π11(x) < Π12(x)
and
Π11(x) + (N − 1)Π12(x) = Π˜11(x1) < 0
which holds by presupposition.

6.11 Proof of proposition 8
Suppose that x1 ∈ E1. If Mˆ(x1) is positive definite ∀ s1, ..., sk > 0 then i) all eigenvalues of
−Jˆ(x1) must be positive or have positive real part (see e.g. Tang et al. (2007)) and ii) −Jˆ(x1)
is a P -matrix (see e.g. Gale and Nikaido (1965), p. 84). But i) implies that Jˆ(x1) only has
negative eigenvalues or eigenvalues with negative real parts. Hence x = (x1, ..., x1) must be a
symmetrically stable equilibrium. Further, ii) implies that Det(−Jˆ(x1)) > 0 and the second
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claim follows from Det(−Jˆ(x1)) = s1 · ... · skDet(−J˜(x1)).

6.12 Proof of proposition 9
The supermodularity together with the positivity of the principal minors and s1, ..., sk > 0 imply
that −Jˆ(x1) is an M-Matrix (a matrix with non-positive off diagonal elements, positive diagonal
elements and positive principal minors) for any choice of s1, ..., sk > 0. But as all eigenvalues
of an M-Matrix are known to be positive or have positive real part (see Tang et al. (2007)) the
claim follows immediately.

6.13 Proof of theorem 4
The proof of theorem 4 requires the following two lemmata. The norm in use is ‖·‖ ≡ ‖·‖∞. Let
B¯ (x∗, ε) denote a closed ε-ball about x∗.
Lemma 3 Suppose x∗ ∈ Es and let φ be the joint best-response function (4) and V ≡ B¯ (x∗, ε) ⊂
SN . Then φ : V → SN is a contraction on V if ϕi : U¯1 → Si for U¯1 ≡ B¯
(
x∗−1, ε
) ⊂ SN−1 is a
contraction on U¯1 for i = 1, ..., k.
Proof:
Because of symmetry we need only regard player g = 1. Suppose that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k ϕi is
a contraction on U¯1 for a given ε > 0. Hence there exists qi ∈ [0, 1) with
x−1 ∈ U¯1 ⇒
∣∣ϕi (x∗−1)− ϕi (x−1)∣∣ ≤ qi ∥∥x∗−1 − x−1∥∥
Let q ≡ max {qi} and x−1 ∈ U¯1. Then
∥∥ϕ(x∗−1)− ϕ(x−1)∥∥ = max
1≤i≤k
{∣∣ϕi(x∗−1)− ϕi(x−1)∣∣}
≤ q ∥∥x∗−1 − x−1∥∥
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Hence ϕ is a contraction on U¯1. By symmetry ϕ(x−g) is a contraction on U¯g ≡ B¯(x∗−g, ε) for
g = 2, ..., N . Suppose x ∈ V and hence x−g ∈ U¯g. Then
‖φ(x∗)− φ(x)‖ ≤ q ∥∥x∗−g − x−g∥∥ g = 1, ..., N
≤ q ‖x∗ − x‖
which shows that φ(x) is a contraction on V .

Lemma 4 Suppose that
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j ∣∣∣ < 1N−1 and x∗ ∈ Es. Then there exists a closed ball
U¯i ⊂ SN−1 about (x∗−1) such that ϕi is a contraction on U¯i.
Proof:
Define σi(x−1) ≡
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∂ϕi(x−1)∂x2j ∣∣∣ and q ≡ (N−1)σi(x∗−1). Then q ∈ [0, 1). As σi(x−1) is continuous
on SN−1 we have that for all ε ∈ (0, 1−qN−1 ] there exists a δ(ε) > 0 such that
∥∥x∗−1 − x−1∥∥ ≤ δ ⇒ ∣∣σi(x∗−1)− σi(x−1)∣∣ < ε
Hence if σi(x∗−1) > σi(x−1) then σi(x−1) <
q
N−1 <
1
N−1 . If σi(x
∗−1) ≤ σi(x−1) then
σi(x−1) < ε+ σi(x∗−1) = ε+
q
N − 1 ≤
1
N − 1
Let δ ≡ δ
(
1−q
N−1
)
and U¯i ≡ B¯
(
(x∗−1), δ
)
. Hence
x−1 ∈ U¯i ⇒ σi(x−1) < 1
N − 1
Because of symmetry we have
x−1 ∈ U¯i ⇒
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x−1)∂xnj
∣∣∣∣ < 1N − 1 ∀n = 2, ...., N (32)
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By the mean value theorem:
∣∣ϕi(x−1′)− ϕi(x−1)∣∣ ≤ ∥∥x−1′ − x−1∥∥ sup
0≤t≤1
‖x˜−1‖=1
∣∣∣∇ϕi (x−1′ + t (x−1 − x−1′)) · (x˜−1)T ∣∣∣
where x−1, x′−1 ∈ U¯i imply that also x−1 + t
(
x′−1 − x−1
) ∈ U¯i for t ∈ [0, 1] as the closed ball U¯i
is a convex set. Let x(t) ≡ x−1′ + t(x−1 − x−1′). Then
Q ≡ sup
0≤t≤1
‖x˜−1‖=1
|∇ϕi(x(t)) · (x˜−1)|
= sup
0≤t≤1
‖x˜−1‖=1
∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x21 (x(t))x˜21 + ∂ϕi∂x22 (x(t))x˜22 + ...+ ∂ϕi∂xNk (x(t))x˜Nk∣∣∣
= sup
0≤t≤1
{∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x21 (x(t))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x2k (x(t))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xN1 (x(t))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xNk (x(t))∣∣∣}
=
∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x21 (t∗)∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂x2k (x(t∗))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xN1 (x(t∗))∣∣∣+ ...+ ∣∣∣ ∂ϕi∂xNk (x(t∗))∣∣∣
where the last step follows from the continuity of the partial derivatives and t ∈ [0, 1].
But (32) then implies
Q <
N − 1
N − 1 = 1
As a consequence ∣∣ϕi(x−1′)− ϕi(x−1)∣∣ ≤ Q∥∥x−1′ − x−1∥∥
for all x−1, x′−1 ∈ U¯i and Q ∈ [0, 1). Hence ϕi is a contraction on U¯i.

Proof of theorem 4:
Because of permutation-symmetry it does not matter which player marginally changes his strat-
egy at a symmetric equilibrium. Then for j = 1, ..., k
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ˜i(x¯∗)∂x¯j
∣∣∣∣ = (N − 1) ∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j
∣∣∣∣
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Hence
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ˜i(x¯∗)∂x¯j
∣∣∣∣ = (N − 1) k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j
∣∣∣∣
and thus by presupposition
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂ϕi(x∗−1)∂x2j
∣∣∣∣ < 1N − 1
By lemma 4 there exists ε > 0 such that ϕ1i is a contraction on U¯i ≡ B¯i(x∗−1, εi). By the proof
of lemma 3 ϕ(x−1) is a contraction on U¯ ≡ B¯(x∗−1, ε) where ε ≡ min {εi}. But then by lemma
3 φ is a contraction on V ≡ B¯(x∗, ε).

I now present a numerical example that violates the condition of a dominant diagonal but
satisfies the contraction condition (25). Suppose k = N = 2 and x∗ is an interior symmetric
equilibrium. Let the Jacobian J(x∗) be given by
J(x∗) =

Π111 Π
1
12 Π
1
13 Π
1
14
Π121 Π
1
22 Π
1
23 Π
1
24
Π231 Π
2
32 Π
2
33 Π
2
34
Π241 Π
2
42 Π
2
43 Π
2
44
 =

−1 1/2 1/2 0
1/2 −1 1/8 1/8
0 1/2 −1 1/2
1/8 1/8 1/2 −1

As can be seen from the first row diagonal dominance fails to hold. However, using the implicit
function theorem the partial derivatives are ∂∂x21ϕ1(x21, x22) = 9/12,
∂
∂x22
ϕ1(x21, x22) = 1/12,
∂
∂x21
ϕ2(x21, x22) = 1/2 and ∂∂x22ϕ2(x21, x22) = 1/6. Hence (25) is satisfied.
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